July 19, 2024

راءِ: افغانستان جو خاتمو ا preواٽ ترتيب ڏنل نه ھو. اها ارادي سان onmentڏڻ هئي

راءِ: افغانستان جو خاتمو ا preواٽ ترتيب ڏنل نه ھو.  اها ارادي سان onmentڏڻ هئي

جيڪي دليل اسان آفيسرن کان hearingي رھيا آھيون ان ناڪاميءَ جي باري ۾ ل collapseي ٿو خود خدمت ڪندڙ. ناگزيريت جو تصور الزام يا احتساب کي ختم ڪري ٿو.

دهشتگرديءَ خلاف جنگ آمريڪا وانگر شروع ٿي جواب 1 سيپٽمبر 2001 جي دهشتگرد حملن تائين ، جڏھن القاعده جي اغوا ڪندڙن ، طالبان جي ڪنٽرول واري افغانستان ۾ اسامه بن لادن جي ھدايت ڪئي ، چار آمريڪي مسافر جهازن جو ڪنٽرول ورتو ۽ نيويارڪ ۾ ورلڊ ٽريڊ سينٽر ۽ پينٽاگون تي حملو ڪيو.
اهو هڪ سان هڪي اچي ٿو تعطل افغانستان جي گهرو ويڙهه ۾ طالبان فوجن ۽ اتر اتحاد جي ويڙهاڪ فوجين جي وچ ۾. 9/11 جي پ Followingيان ، آمريڪي منصوبو طالبان کي فتح ڪرڻ ۽ ڪابل تي قبضو ڪرڻ ۾ انھن فوجين جي مدد ڪرڻ ھو. حڪمت عمليءَ ۾ مسئلو ھي ھو ته انھن اتر اتحادين جون فوجون موڪليون composedهيل ازبڪ ، تاجڪ ۽ هزاره ويڙهاڪن جي پشتون قبائلي پٽي ۾ گهرو ويڙهه ختم ڪرڻ بدران وongائڻ جو خطرو آهي.
تنھنڪري اتر اتحاد جا جنگجو ضبط ٿيل اتر ۾ سندن قبائلي زمينون جڏهن ته حامد ڪرزئي ، پشتون قبيلي جو هڪ اهم ميمبر ، ڏکڻ ۾ پشتون علائقي کي فتح ڪرڻ جي ڪوشش ڪئي. منهنجي اسپيشل فورسز جي ٽيم ، سي آءِ اي جي نيم فوجي ٽيم سان گڏ ، ڪرزئي سان اروزگان ۾ گھڙيو ته جيئن فقط چند درجن قبائلي ويڙهاڪن سان ملاقات ٿئي. اسان جي ناممڪن مهم سا theئي ٽيمپليٽ جي پيروي ڪئي جنهن کي اسان هن هفتي ڏedو آهي جڏهن طالبان ملڪ کي تيز رفتار سان ڪابل تي قبضو ڪرڻ لاءِ ڪي ڏيو.

اسان جي مهم جي شروعات کان و Karzaiي ، ڪرزئي ملا عبدالغني برادر سان Talibanالھايو ، ھڪڙو سينئر طالبان ا leaderواڻ ، تقريبا almost روزانو. ationsالهه dولهه ناچ جي موضوع جي چو aroundاري نچندي رهي جيئن اتر اتحاد جلدي اتر جي اهم شهرن تي قبضو ڪري ورتو جڏهن ته ڪرزئي ڏکڻ ۾ طالبان سان جڙيل قبيلن جي ڪتاڻ کي محفوظ ڪيو.

ڪرزئي جو بيان سادو هو: هن جي فوجن کي آمريڪا جي فوجي حمايت حاصل هئي پر هو چاهي ٿو ته پشتون پرامن طور تي هٿيار ٽا ڪري. 9/11 جي پ Inاڙيءَ ۾ ، پاڪستان کي مجبور ڪيو ويو ته ھو طالبان کي پنھنجي مدد معطل ڪري ، تنھنڪري انھن جو را regime isار ۽ ٽٽل ھو. برادر پنهنجي آخري ، وڏي فوج موڪلي ، ڪرزئي جي نن antiي ٽولي تي طالبان مخالف ويڙهاڪن تي حملو ڪرڻ لاءِ. جڏھن انھن کي آمريڪي فضائي طاقت ذريعي روڪيو ويو ، س allني وڏن پشتون قبائلي ا leadersواڻن ڪرزئي جي طرف وectڻ شروع ڪيو يا غير جانبداريءَ جو اعلان ڪيو ۽ طالبان جي حمايت ختم ڪئي. برادر ڊسمبر 2001 جي شروعات ۾ قن Kandaharار ۽ افغانستان پاڻ کي ڪرزئي جي حوالي ڪري ڏيو.

طالبان جي زوال سان گڏ ، آمريڪي ۽ اتحادي فوجن س allني جنگي سردارن جون فوجون ختم ڪري andڏيون ۽ ڪابل کي بااختيار بڻائڻ جي اميد ۾ افغان نيشنل آرمي قائم ڪئي. افغانستان کي حفاظت ڪرڻي ھئي ھڪڙي نسلي طور تي مربوط فوج پاران مرڪزي حڪومت جي ڪنٽرول ھي. ۽ طالبان قيادت ، جيڪو toي پاڪستان ويو ، rouيهر منظم ٿيو جئين پاڪستان خاموشيءَ سان ان و growingندڙ خطري جي حمايت ڪئي (پاڪستان ڊگھي عرصي کان طالبان جي حمايت ڪرڻ کان انڪار ڪري چڪو آھي).

عراق تي حملو سبب ٿيو س USي آمريڪي فوج کي خوني بغاوت ۾ ڪيو و thatي ٿو جيڪو اسان جي س -ني رضاڪار فوج جي حدن کي ushedڪي ٿو پاڻ کي برقرار رکڻ لاءِ. افغانستان ۾ ، جنگي لشڪر جي obاھڻ ھڪڙي حفاظتي خلا پيدا ڪئي جيڪا آھستي آھستي طالبان جي بغاوت کي جنم ڏنو ، جنھن جي حمايت پاڪستان ڪئي.

افغان نيشنل آرمي ا stillا ابتدائي مرحلي ۾ ھئي ۽ آمريڪا ان خطري جو جواب ڏيڻ لاءِ فوجون نه موڪلي سگھيو جئين ھن عراق جي زوال کي روڪڻ لاءِ وڙھيو. آمريڪا پاڪستان کي طالبان جي مدد ڪرڻ جي پابندي به نه ل becauseائي سگهيو becauseو ته تمام وڏي سپلائي لائينون جيڪي آمريڪي فوجن کي سپورٽ ڪنديون آهن اهي پاڪستان جي ذريعي ٿي ويون [and had to be maintained through polite diplomacy.

Years of benign neglect followed in Afghanistan as Kabul and all our Afghan allies became more and more alienated by the America’s lack of action to combat the Taliban. Kabul’s legitimacy was based on the Loya Jirga, a tribal council that established the government. But the defense of the nation rested on the Afghan National Army that could only stand and fight when supported by coalition partners. And Kabul faced an insurgency supported by Pakistan.

The question was: whose support would endure? America’s support of Kabul or Pakistan’s support to the Taliban? Few believed the US would stay indefinitely and the Afghan National Army needed generations to become a viable fighting force as Afghanistan faced a growing insurgency that had become another civil war.

For all the criticism of the Afghan National Army’s lack of capability, many Americans forget our own Civil War. Though the Federal Army fought the Confederate Army, both armies were composed of locally raised forces like Joshua Chamberlain’s famed 20th Maine Volunteer Infantry Regiment that was made famous for defeating the 15th Alabama Infantry Regiment at Gettysburg. Such forces fought bloody battles across America that eventually led to the standing army we have today with no such regional affiliations. But that took decades.

But in Afghanistan, locally raised and highly cohesive insurgent tribal forces supported by Pakistan fought a fledgling Afghan National Army that was simply outmatched without coalition forces fighting at its side. Afghanistan settled into a stalemate as Kabul retained control of what territory it could and the Taliban avoided direct confrontations with coalition forces that it could not defeat. The years ticked on as the US effort was simply aimed at maintaining this status quo and depended on an Afghan Army that could not stand without us.

Amerine and his teammates with Karzai, December 3, 2001.

With the election of President Barack Obama, the US announced a plan to withdraw from Afghanistan and the people of Afghanistan faced a stark choice: believe in Kabul, backed by an incapable Army that would soon have to stand on its own, or accept that the Taliban were likely going to seize control once again with the backing of Pakistan.

The Taliban began carrying out the same negotiations with the Pashtun tribes that Hamid Karzai carried out in 2001. Their message was simple: the US will abandon Kabul while the Taliban have the backing of Pakistan. With no significant warlord armies left to counter their widening grip on the country due to their demobilization, tribes all across Afghanistan began negotiating for their capitulation once the US departed.

The Obama administration quickly recognized how precarious the situation was in Afghanistan and indefinitely delayed such a withdrawal. If nothing else, it did not want to be the author of Kabul’s collapse. But the election of President Donald Trump led to his repeated calls for an immediate withdrawal that established a framework for US departure.

Many believed President Joe Biden would be more cautious once elected. He witnessed the disastrous fragmentation of Iraq and rise of ISIS when the US departed precipitously. But he pressed on anyway, executing the withdrawal of US forces that left the tribes of Afghanistan little choice but capitulation. The ANA collapsed predictably and there was no longer a Northern Alliance to rally behind. And so everyone surrendered as quickly in 2021 as they did in 2001. The circle was complete.

Rumor has it that Karzai again negotiated with Baradar in the final days of the Afghan government this week: the roles were reversed as Karzai again sought to limit bloodshed. I do not know if this is true. But the unfolding humanitarian disaster will be anything but bloodless.

Our mission in 2001 was to remove the terrorist safe havens of Afghanistan. It was an act of revenge. I was proud to see it evolve into something more as little girls went to school and women were allowed to vote. But now the noblest gains of our mission are lost and we are left to say, “At least we got Bin Laden.” It just rings so hollow to me.

The last text from a man I fought beside at Tarin Kowt reads “Hi, Jason my dear friend, thank you for your support…Taliban is already here, if I survive we will contact again. Thank you for everything.”

I will never understand why he thanked me.

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